Authorization model

The relationship graph that authorizes access to resources. Authority for this page is agentarea-platform/libs/common/agentarea_common/rebac/openfga/model.fga; the deployable payload authorization-model.json next to it is generated from it and ships in the image.

Synopsis

model
  schema 1.1

type User

type Agent

type Workspace
  relations
    define members: [User, Agent]
    define admin: [User]

type role
  relations
    define can_read: [User:*, Agent:*]
    define can_write: [User:*, Agent:*]
    define can_manage: [User:*, Agent:*]

type role_assignment
  relations
    define assignee: [User, Agent]
    define role: [role]
    define can_read: assignee and can_read from role
    define can_write: assignee and can_write from role
    define can_manage: assignee and can_manage from role

type project
  relations
    define workspace: [Workspace]
    define parent: [project]
    define role_assignment: [role_assignment]
    define reader: [User, Agent]
    define writer: [User, Agent]
    define manager: [User, Agent]
    define can_read: reader or can_read from role_assignment or can_read from parent or admin from workspace
    define can_write: writer or can_write from role_assignment or can_write from parent or admin from workspace
    define can_manage: manager or can_manage from role_assignment or can_manage from parent or admin from workspace

type resource
  relations
    define project: [project]
    define role_assignment: [role_assignment]
    define reader: [User, Agent]
    define writer: [User, Agent]
    define manager: [User, Agent]
    define can_read: reader or can_read from role_assignment or can_read from project
    define can_write: writer or can_write from role_assignment or can_write from project
    define can_manage: manager or can_manage from role_assignment or can_manage from project
    define invoker: [User, Agent, Workspace#members]
    define can_invoke: invoker

Identity types are PascalCase; governance types are lowercase. Object references are literal, so a tuple reads resource:<uuid>#reader@User:<id>.

Fields

`Workspace`

Relation	Accepts	Grants
`members`	`User`, `Agent`	Membership only. Not consumed by any `can_*` computation.
`admin`	`User`	All three bits on every `project` under the workspace, and transitively on their resources.

`role`

Relation	Accepts	Grants
`can_read`	`User:`, `Agent:`	The read bit to any assignment referencing this role.
`can_write`	`User:`, `Agent:`	The write bit.
`can_manage`	`User:`, `Agent:`	The manage bit.

A role is a bag of independent bits. Each enabled bit must be written for both User:* and Agent:*; a bit written only for User:* denies agent assignees.

`role_assignment`

Relation	Accepts	Grants
`assignee`	`User`, `Agent`	The subject the assignment binds.
`role`	`role`	The bundle whose bits apply.
`can_read`	computed	`assignee` intersected with `can_read from role`.
`can_write`	computed	`assignee` intersected with `can_write from role`.
`can_manage`	computed	`assignee` intersected with `can_manage from role`.

Attach each assignment to exactly one object; attaching one assignment to several objects amplifies its bits across all of them.

`project`

Relation	Accepts	Grants
`workspace`	`Workspace`	The owning workspace, enabling the `admin` cascade.
`parent`	`project`	Downward inheritance of all three bits.
`role_assignment`	`role_assignment`	Bundled grants.
`reader` / `writer` / `manager`	`User`, `Agent`	Direct grant of the matching bit.
`can_read` / `can_write` / `can_manage`	computed	Direct relation, or the same bit from an assignment, or from `parent`, or `admin from workspace`.

`resource`

Relation	Accepts	Grants
`project`	`project`	Upward link; inherits all three bits downward from the project.
`role_assignment`	`role_assignment`	Bundled grants.
`reader` / `writer` / `manager`	`User`, `Agent`	Direct grant of the matching bit.
`can_read` / `can_write` / `can_manage`	computed	Direct relation, or the same bit from an assignment, or from `project`.
`invoker`	`User`, `Agent`, `Workspace#members`	Who may run the agent. Granted explicitly: an agent’s creator holds it from creation, and nothing else implies it.
`can_invoke`	computed	`invoker` only. Reading, managing or administering the workspace does not let anyone run an agent.

Agents, skills, MCP servers and registered clients are all resource:<uuid>. Which kind a resource is lives in the database, not the graph.

Values

Permission bits

can_read, can_write and can_manage are independent. None implies another. A role granting only can_write yields can_write: true with can_read: false and can_manage: false.

Verb to bit — permission service

Applied by require_permission and the DI-resolved permission service.

Verb	Bit
`view`, `use`, `read`, `execute`, `operate`, `connect`	`can_read`
`edit`, `write`, `update`, `configure`	`can_write`
`manage`, `own`, `delete`	`can_manage`

A verb outside this map is denied and logged at warning level.

Verb to bit — relationship explorer

Applied by the /v1/workspaces/{workspace}/access-control check endpoint. Note the absence of update.

Verb	Bit
`use`, `view`, `read`, `operate`, `connect`, `execute`	`can_read`
`configure`, `edit`, `write`	`can_write`
`manage`, `own`, `delete`	`can_manage`

A value that is neither a mapped verb nor one of the three bits returns allowed: false without querying the graph.

Relation aliases accepted on write

The explorer write endpoint maps a submitted relation onto a resource grant.

Submitted	Written
`reader`, `viewers`, `connectors`	`reader`
`writer`, `editors`	`writer`
`manager`, `owners`, `operators`	`manager`

Anything else is rejected. A subject_set (group) body is rejected; bundled access goes through role and role_assignment.

Namespaces accepted by the explorer

Namespace	Used for
`Agent`, `MCPServer`, `Skill`, `SkillCollection`	Confirming the object belongs to the caller’s workspace

The namespace selects a repository for that check only. The tuple written or checked is always against resource:<object>.

Subject forms accepted on write

Form	Validation
`User:<user_id>`	Must be the workspace owner, a membership row, or the caller.
`Agent:<agent_uuid>`	Must resolve in the caller’s workspace.

Seeded tuples

On workspace creation:

Tuple
`Workspace:<ws>#members@User:<creator>`
`Workspace:<ws>#admin@User:<creator>`
`project:<ws>-root#workspace@Workspace:<ws>`

On governed resource creation:

Tuple
`resource:<id>#project@project:<ws>-root`
`resource:<id>#reader@User:<creator>`
`resource:<id>#writer@User:<creator>`
`resource:<id>#manager@User:<creator>`

The root project id is the workspace id suffixed with -root. Both writers are idempotent; an “already exists” response is treated as success.

Enforcement

Surface	Status
Agent edit, agent delete	`Check` enforced
Skill edit, skill delete	`Check` enforced
MCP server edit, MCP server delete	`Check` enforced
Model instance delete	Called, but `model_instance` is ungoverned — returns allow without a graph query
Registered client use	`Check` enforced
Read and list endpoints	Not graph-filtered. Scoped by workspace in the database.
Reverse lookup (`list_objects`)	Implemented, no callers.
Project-scoped data	Not graph-authorized. Resources attach to the workspace root project; other project scoping is workspace-string-based.
Tool invocation	Not in this graph. Decided by the policy engine. See policy rule syntax.

Resource type	Behaviour
`model_instance`, `model`	Ungoverned. Return allow without querying the graph.
Anything else	Treated as `resource:<id>` and fails closed with no tuples.

Condition	Behaviour
Graph unreachable	The client raises. The check does not coerce to allow or deny.
Backend `disabled`	The permission service returns `True` for every check.
Graph write fails	HTTP 503. The operation does not proceed.
Explorer endpoints	All require workspace admin, including reads and checks.

Invariants the graph cannot express, enforced by the writer instead: one workspace and one parent per project, one project per resource, same-workspace edges, an acyclic project graph, one object per role_assignment, and resource kind resolved from the database.

Defaults and overrides

AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_BACKEND accepts only openfga; any other value fails startup.

Source	Value
Code default	`openfga`
`docker-compose.dev.yaml` (`make up-dev`)	`openfga`
`docker-compose.yaml` (`make up`)	`openfga`
Helm chart	`openfga` when `openfga.enabled=true`, which is the chart default

Setting	Code default
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_URL`	`http://openfga:8080`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_STORE_ID`	`""` (resolved by bootstrap when empty)
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_MODEL_ID`	`None`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_TIMEOUT`	`10.0`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_BOOTSTRAP`	`false`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_APPLY_MODEL`	`false`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_STORE_NAME`	`agentarea`
`AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_MODEL_PATH`	`None`

docker-compose.dev.yaml and the Helm chart both set BOOTSTRAP and APPLY_MODEL to true. The applied model is the one packaged with the image, so the relations the code checks always exist in it; nothing is mounted. AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_MODEL_PATH is for a deployment that extends the model. It names a model built with OpenFGA modular models: an fga.mod listing the packaged model.fga plus your own module, transformed with fga model transform --file fga.mod. The process refuses to start when that model drops or redefines any packaged type, relation or condition, and names each one. Additions are yours. With APPLY_MODEL enabled the model’s id is used for the process lifetime. With it disabled, AGENTAREA_AUTHZ_FGA_MODEL_ID is used and no model is written. Bootstrap compares candidate models by normalized content ignoring ids, so an unchanged model is reused rather than rewritten. When several processes race a store create, all converge on the earliest store with that name.

Example

Grant a write-only role bundle on a project, and confirm the bits do not roll up:

role:writeonly#can_write@User:*
role:writeonly#can_write@Agent:*

role_assignment:ra2#assignee@User:ub
role_assignment:ra2#role@role:writeonly

resource:res2#role_assignment@role_assignment:ra2

Check(User:ub, can_write,  resource:res2) -> true
Check(User:ub, can_read,   resource:res2) -> false
Check(User:ub, can_manage, resource:res2) -> false

Policy rule syntax

The other authorization surface, which governs tool invocation

Limits

Timeouts and pagination on the graph client

Errors

The 403 and 503 responses these checks produce

The AgentArea model

The reasoning behind the type set

Start here

Concepts

Guides

Self-host

Reference

API reference

API endpoints

Community

Authorization model

Synopsis

Fields

`Workspace`

`role`

`role_assignment`

`project`

`resource`

Values

Permission bits

Verb to bit — permission service

Verb to bit — relationship explorer

Relation aliases accepted on write

Namespaces accepted by the explorer

Subject forms accepted on write

Seeded tuples

Enforcement

Defaults and overrides

Example

Policy rule syntax

Limits

Errors

The AgentArea model

​Synopsis

​Fields

​Workspace

​role

​role_assignment

​project

​resource

​Values

​Permission bits

​Verb to bit — permission service

​Verb to bit — relationship explorer

​Relation aliases accepted on write

​Namespaces accepted by the explorer

​Subject forms accepted on write

​Seeded tuples

​Enforcement

​Defaults and overrides

​Example

​Related

Policy rule syntax

Limits

Errors

The AgentArea model

Synopsis

Fields

`Workspace`

`role`

`role_assignment`

`project`

`resource`

Values

Permission bits

Verb to bit — permission service

Verb to bit — relationship explorer

Relation aliases accepted on write

Namespaces accepted by the explorer

Subject forms accepted on write

Seeded tuples

Enforcement

Defaults and overrides

Example

Related